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The answers to these questions offer an introduction 
to China’s innovation policies and the R&D activities and 
strategies of foreign MNCs in China.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
We studied China’s indigenous innovation policies, and 
the decisions and activities of major MNCs in the informa-
tion and communication technology industry in China. 
We also interviewed a dozen R&D executives at five large 
US MNCs, executives of IT industry associations, and US 
government officials in China. 
Table 1 provides background information on each of the 
MNCs. We do not reveal company names at their request.
CHINA’S INDIGENOUS INNOVATION 
POLICIES
China is now the leading manufacturer of many elec-
tronics products, assembling advanced PCs, mobile phones, 
networking equipment, and other high-tech goods. Yet only 
a few Chinese companies are globally competitive in any 
of these industries, and MNCs or Taiwanese companies 
produce most exports. As a result, although China plays a 
major role in the global IT industry, it captures a small share 
of the profits in the value chain.3
China’s government leaders want to move into higher 
value activities such as R&D, particularly the development 
R ecently, the growth of R&D in emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, and particularly India and China, has captured the attention of researchers.1 Collectively called BRIC economies, these large and 
growing markets also produce many relatively low-cost sci-
entists and engineers. To develop products for these markets, 
and to tap their skilled human resources, multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) are setting up R&D labs in these countries 
and in some cases outsourcing R&D activities to local firms.
China has a strong desire to learn from MNCs, while 
developing domestic companies that can compete glob-
ally and reduce China’s dependence on foreign intellectual 
property (IP). The resulting indigenous innovation policies 
have raised alarm among MNCs, which complain that these 
policies can be arbitrary and unfair to foreign companies.2
Based on a review of the literature and interviews con-
ducted in China in 2009, we asked the following questions:
•	 What are the objectives of China’s indigenous inno-
vation policies, and how is China translating these 
objectives into specific regulations and initiatives?
•	 What factors influence MNC R&D activities in China, 
and what is the impact of China’s indigenous innova-
tion policies?
•	 How do MNCs manage R&D in China within the con-
text of their global organizations?
Multinational corporations seeking access to China’s burgeoning con-
sumer markets and human resources are establishing R&D centers in 
the country and developing ways to thread a path through its complex 
innovation policies.
Jason Dedrick and Jian Tang, Syracuse University
Kenneth L. Kraemer, University of California, Irvine
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of new products and advanced technologies.4,5 Starting 
in the mid-1980s, China instituted a series of policies to 
promote domestic technology development for commer-
cial markets.6 These policies helped domestic enterprises 
and promoted innovation in the PC, electronics, software, 
integrated circuit, and telecommunications equipment 
industries.
China’s five-year 2006 to 2010 plan further targeted the 
information industry by focusing on indigenous innovation. 
It emphasized
•	 developing domestic standards and technologies,
•	 promoting innovation in IT products, and
•	 supporting domestically owned technology firms.
At the same time, China announced a 15-year “Medium- 
to-Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology,” which called for the country to become an 
innovation-oriented society by 2020 and a world leader in 
science and technology by 2050.7
A statement by Zhang Dejiang, a member of the Po-
litical Bureau of the Communist Party and vice prime 
minister, captures the motivation behind these policies 
(www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n13702866/
n13702883/14206919.html): 
Under the guidance of Decisions of Accelerating the 
Growth and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries, 
it is important to enhance the policy support and strengthen 
the capability of indigenous innovation, especially to make 
the IT industry to be the leading industry. … It is also 
essential to continue supporting TD-SCDMA [time division 
synchronous code division multiple access, a standard], and 
encourage the industrialization and internationalization of 
TD-LTE [time division, long-term evolution].
Promoting domestic standards and technologies
China seeks to develop IP and core technologies, and 
views technical standards as crucial to its success.8,9 It has 
been working hard to push Chinese standards as interna-
tional standards. For example, the government selected 
TD-SCDMA to be the 3G mobile standard of China Mobile 
(China’s largest mobile carrier), and the International 
Telecommunication Union has approved it as a global 
standard.6,10
The government clearly uses the standards-setting pro-
cess as a tool to support domestic companies. Establishing 
domestic standards reduces the competitive advantage 
of MNCs, which use technologies based on international 
standards.
MNCs have been involved in some Chinese standards 
initiatives, such as TD-SCDMA, the Audio Video Standard 
(AVS), and the Intelligent Grouping and Resource Sharing 
(IGRS) protocol, a home networking standard.10 But MNCs 
are not involved in other standards, such as the Wireless 
LAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI). It 
would be fair to say that China sees the importance of par-
ticipating in global standards bodies as well as the value of 
involving MNCs in its own standards forums.
In the longer run, China seeks to become a leading player 
in international standards bodies, but plans to do so from a 
position of internationalizing its own national standards as 
well as localizing international standards.10 The MNCs real-
ize that they will need to adopt China’s standards in some 
cases if they want to participate in the Chinese market, so 
they attempt to influence those standards when possible.
The desire to promote domestic standards rather than 
just adopt international standards might put China behind 
in adopting some technologies. For example, its promo-
tion of TD-SCDMA for 3G mobile phone service and the 
decision to require China Mobile to adopt the standard left 
China years behind other countries in rolling out 3G mobile 
phone service. Yet the government was willing to pay that 
price to promote a domestic standard and ensure that do-
mestic equipment manufacturers such as Datang, a state 
enterprise under the China Academy of Telecommunication 
Technology, would have a leading role in the 3G market.10
Promoting domestic innovation
To promote domestic innovation, the government offers 
tax incentives and other financial benefits to domestic and 
foreign firms that set up R&D centers in China. To be eli-
gible for these benefits, firms must seek certification, which 
means they must
Table 1. Background information for companies in the study.* 
Characteristic MNC 1 MNC 2 MNC 3 MNC 4 MNC 5
Industry sector Computers, software, 
and services
Computers Software Semiconductors Mobile 
communications
No. of employees  
in China
20,000 > 10,000 4,000 7,000 10,000
No. of R&D  
employees in China
6,000 total; 300 PhDs < 100 researchers 
plus interns and 
postdoctoral 
candidates 
2,000 total, 250 in 
research labs
> 1,200 hardware 
and software 
engineers
1,000 to 2,000
* From company documents and interview notes.
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the PC market. Even favored state enterprises often face 
competition in the sectors they dominate.11
Bureaucratic competition in policy 
implementation
Although outsiders might see China’s government as 
a unified actor making policies that affect the MNCs, the 
reality is much different—the state’s role can be ambigu-
ous and is not always unified.10 Several central government 
institutions implement indigenous innovation policies; each 
institution has different agendas, as do provincial and city 
governments.4
The key central government agencies are the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST), the National Development 
and Reformation Committee (NDRC), and the Ministry of 
Education.2 The Ministry of Industry and Information Tech-
nology (MIIT) is a key agency in the information industry. 
The Standardization Administration of China (SAC) leads 
in developing standards policies. According to interview-
ees, there is inconsistency and sometimes conflict among 
central government agencies. This might reflect not only 
institutional rivalry, but also the personalized nature of 
many policy processes in China, which only increases the 
level of uncertainty and ambiguity in policy outcomes.4
Policy objectives can also differ between the central 
and local governments. For example, the central govern-
ment sets the certification criteria that define a high-tech 
company, whereas local governments certify individual 
companies. MNCs seek high-tech certification because it 
reduces the corporate income tax from 25 to 15 percent. 
For certification as a high-tech company, an MNC’s local 
subsidiary should perform R&D and file patents in China. 
However, most local governments mainly want jobs and 
have been willing to certify MNCs as high-tech companies 
without strict adherence to the criteria. As one interviewee 
stated, “Local governments are not fussy about what they 
label as R&D in their reports to the central government, so 
a wide variety of activities end up being called R&D.”
As another interviewee stated, “The local governments 
are under pressure to stimulate high-tech industry, so they 
attract companies that appear on the surface to be doing 
high-tech work although in reality they might not be doing 
so. Although the central government is concerned about the 
long-term impact and the development of indigenous R&D, 
local governments are not.”
The result of competition among localities for invest-
ment and jobs is the emergence of a regionalized high-tech 
industry, with major regions specializing in different 
aspects of production and innovation.4 For example, Beijing 
hosts MNCs and domestic firms specializing in software 
development and is the home to many MNC R&D labs, as 
well as Lenovo. The industry is concentrated in the Zhong-
guancun Science Park, a development supported by the 
central and Beijing municipal governments.12
•	 register in mainland China (which does not include 
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan),
•	 engage in R&D,
•	 develop independent IP in core technologies, and
•	 file patents in China.9
Most certified firms are domestic companies, as the 
requirements are problematic for foreign firms. According 
to one interviewee, the head of an IT industry organiza-
tion, “There are some high-profile cases where companies 
left China or chose another location in Asia, such as 
the Philippines, because of the IP laws and certification 
requirements.” Other MNCs conduct R&D in China without 
receiving certification or the associated incentives.
The government also adopted measures to speed tech-
nology development and transfer, including financial 
support, tax incentives, IP protection, and domestic R&D 
centers. It also required more technological investments 
from MNCs, including R&D centers that engage in research 
collaboration with local researchers and institutions. Our 
interviews indicate that China anticipates that domestic 
researchers in these collaborations will have access to ad-
vanced technologies from the MNCs.
Supporting domestic firms
China’s indigenous innovation policy gives preference 
to domestic companies in procurement by government 
agencies and state-owned enterprises. Regulations state 
that “If government departments purchase software related 
to national sovereignty or economic security, they should 
follow the procedure of government procurement” and give 
preference to local companies.9
China also promotes national champions to act as a 
counterbalance to the market power of MNCs in specific 
sectors; it also encourages these champions to become 
innovators capable of competing globally.2 As one inter-
viewee said, “China’s strategy is to create one strong player 
in each industry segment and to build them up to dominate 
the China market and prepare them to go global. They do 
not care about creating competition among local com-
panies, and they want to protect these companies from 
foreign competition.” However, having national champions 
does not mean that these sectors are competition free. For 
example, Huawei competes at home and abroad with ZTE 
in networking equipment, while Lenovo, China’s leading 
PC maker, faces both domestic and foreign competitors in 
China’s indigenous innovation policy 
gives preference to domestic companies 
in procurement by government agencies 
and state-owned enterprises.
 NoVemBer 2012 73
Key factors influencing the location of 
MNC investment in overseas R&D include 
a large domestic market, availability of 
low-cost R&D manpower, and the scale  
of national technology capabilities.
tioned market growth as a reason for manufacturing in 
China, and cited specific market opportunities for product 
development in the country.
How does this market potential translate into a need for 
R&D in China? One factor is understanding market needs. 
One general manager stated that “China is valuable for R&D 
because the economy is huge and growing bigger, and the 
customers have unique [scale] requirements. By being in 
China, we can gain an edge over competitors because we 
understand these requirements better than others.”
The Chinese market also has some characteristics that 
create novel R&D opportunities for MNCs. For example, 
China bans sales of most videogame consoles, and only 
a few retail outlets sell games. Instead, consumers can 
download games from government-approved websites. One 
company said that this created a potential market for tech-
nology that accelerates downloads and leads to performing 
related work in its China R&D lab.
Another interviewee pointed to the potential for research 
opportunities that take advantage of the vast amount of 
data that certain events can generate in China, such as Web 
traffic during the 2008 Olympics. For technologies such 
as large-scale data mining or managing network capacity 
during huge spikes in traffic, China can serve as a unique 
research environment.
R&D talent availability and cost
Access to China’s large pool of science and engineering 
graduates is a major factor for most MNCs locating R&D in 
China. China’s universities and colleges produce an abun-
dance of graduates in science and engineering. Although 
most of these graduates are not of the caliber that MNCs re-
quire, MNCs select from the cream of the crop—the top 0.5 
percent, according to one company, or the top 10 schools, 
according to another.
Competition for talent has increased as more MNCs enter 
the market, along with Taiwanese and mainland Chinese 
companies. According to several interviewees, state-owned 
enterprises, once unattractive to talented graduates, now 
offer competitive salaries and better benefits—such as sub-
sidized housing—compared with MNCs. In addition, the 
prestige of working for an MNC has somewhat diminished.
This competition has led to salary increases, especially 
for experienced scientists and engineers, as well as for 
managers. Although competition is becoming more intense 
The Shanghai area hosts several MNC R&D labs and 
is home to both MNCs and domestic semiconductor and 
telecommunications companies. Shanghai’s municipal gov-
ernment has played a key role in developing science parks 
and promoting the local IT industry.4 
The Pearl River Delta in southern China hosts the largest 
concentration of hardware manufacturing, including the 
massive Foxconn campus near Shenzhen, which makes 
products for Apple, HP, Dell, Intel, and others. It is also 
home to China’s greatest homegrown high-tech success 
story, Huawei, a network equipment company.
FACTORS INFLUENCING R&D DECISIONS
Key factors influencing the location of MNC investment 
in overseas R&D include a large domestic market, availabil-
ity of low-cost R&D manpower, and the scale of national 
technology capabilities. There is no clear evidence that 
R&D incentives offered by foreign governments have an 
impact on R&D intensity or that adverse policies (such as 
inadequate patent protection or restrictive trade regimes) 
affect the attractiveness of a country for R&D.13
Our interviews support prior research by showing that 
MNCs are attracted to China primarily by the size of the 
domestic market and the availability and low cost of R&D 
talent.14 However, China’s technological capabilities do not 
appear to be an important attraction; its perceived weak 
protection of IP rights might limit the types of R&D activi-
ties conducted there.
Domestic market
The size and growth rate of China’s economy make it 
a unique attraction for MNCs, leading them to make con-
cessions that they might not make in other markets. For 
example, China has as many mobile phone users as the 
combined populations of the US and the European Union 
(about 800 million), and has an estimated 538 million Inter-
net users. China’s economy is larger than the combined GDPs 
of the other three BRIC economies. A continuation of the 
double-digit growth of the past three decades could make 
China the world’s largest economy in less than 20 years.
At the same time, it is difficult for foreign companies to 
enter China’s market. Obstacles include inadequate physi-
cal and financial infrastructure in many places, lack of 
enforceable commercial laws, weak IP protection, heavy 
competition from domestic firms with lower costs, and 
an array of government restrictions on the activities of all 
companies, particularly foreign companies. In the words 
of one interviewee, “Policy is everything and is arbitrary. 
One day you can do [a type of] business, the next day they 
say, ‘Sorry, you can’t.’”
Despite these issues, the Chinese market is so attrac-
tive that MNCs must be there. The representatives of four 
of five MNCs we interviewed mentioned market access as 
a major reason for locating R&D in China. The fifth men-
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and salaries are increasing, the quality of graduates has 
also improved.
One interviewee said, “People used to get PhDs in two 
to three years. No research methodology, just theory. Now 
the education system has improved. They have numerous 
professors with degrees from the US and experience in US 
universities. The gap is much smaller than it was.”
The biggest shortage is in middle managers and higher-
level leaders who can run a project or an entire division. 
There are few people with 10 to 15 years’ experience in 
China, and bringing experienced personnel from the US is 
expensive. Salaries for people with 15 years’ experience are 
comparable to those in other locations such as Ireland or 
Israel, according to one interviewee. One solution to finding 
experienced people is to hire Chinese nationals who have 
studied and worked in the US or other locations to manage 
teams in China.
Despite increased competition and cost, as well as short-
ages in some skills, the availability and quality of science 
and engineering talent is clearly a major attraction for firms 
doing R&D in China. Cost is mentioned less often, but it is 
an advantage. To be clear, although salaries are rising in 
China, there is still a huge gap compared with the US. As of 
2005, a newly graduated computer engineer in China could 
expect to start at $7,500 to $10,000 a year, while in the US, 
the figure was around $60,000.15
INFLUENCE OF CHINA’S POLICIES ON MNC 
STRATEGIES
China’s policies in general have a major influence on 
the decisions of MNCs to locate R&D in China. As one in-
terviewee said, “Most companies are doing only as much 
as the government forces them to. Market access requires 
doing R&D in China.”
Although MNCs might look for incentives or subsidies, 
the bigger motivation is to gain favor from government of-
ficials. In the words of a former R&D director for a major 
MNC, “The main reason that MNCs come to China is cheap 
labor, but it is also to have influence with the government 
so that these companies can participate in large Chinese 
government procurements or in the consumer market. If 
companies play the game right, they can get considerable 
help from the government in many different forms.”
China’s indigenous innovation policies seem to have a 
weaker and mixed effect on MNCs. Companies are gen-
erally unhappy with some requirements, but have been 
willing to expand their R&D activities in China in spite of 
those concerns. When incentives are available, they seek 
certification as high-tech companies. In general, they 
do better with local governments than with the central 
government.
A US official said, “The central government offers sub-
sidies to domestic companies for indigenous development 
of technology. But there is no clear definition of what a 
domestic company is.”
The policy of requiring IP registration in China for firms 
that desire treatment as domestic companies is a major 
concern to some MNCs, less so to others. This difference 
might relate to differences in the firms’ strategies, whether 
they seek incentives, or the extent to which they focus on 
the government and SOE markets.
According to one interviewee,
Registering IP in China doesn’t fit with a global opera-
tions model, where R&D is done in a unified way. How do 
you justify having some part of it coming from China, and 
how do you protect it if you do define some part as from 
China? The business issue is this: Do the benefits of licensing 
in China, like tax benefits, potential sales, goodwill with the 
government, outweigh the IP risk?
On the other hand, another US MNC said that it had ob-
tained certification as a high-tech company. The company 
indicated that the Chinese government defined the cri-
teria in advance, and the company reports performance 
every year. This company has made a major commitment 
to China as a manufacturing and product development lo-
cation, as well as a market, so potential tax incentives are 
especially valuable.
Some MNCs have been more aggressive in challenging 
China’s policies and trying to involve the US government. 
Others try to keep a low profile and avoid possible 
retaliation from the Chinese government. The most vis-
ible and contentious issues in the past have been over IP 
protection—for example, from software piracy—standards 
setting, and content censorship.
MNCs were successful in acting together to challenge 
MIIT’s 2009 order that all new PCs come with Green Dam 
software installed to block certain Internet content. The 
MNCs argued that this was an unreasonable requirement, 
and eventually MIIT dropped the requirement. This success 
came largely because the MNCs allied themselves with Chi-
nese PC makers and consumers, and with the US and other 
governments. In contrast, Google shut down its mainland 
China search engine for a time after being unable to resolve 
censorship issues. In this case, the US government was 
powerless to influence China’s position in spite of criticism 
from the US secretary of state.
Although MNCs might look for incentives 
or subsidies, the bigger motivation is to 
gain favor from government officials.
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for an important government catalogue prepared by 
MIIT, to ensure that it will not be used for import 
substitution, the provision of export subsidies, or to 
discriminate against American equipment manufac-
turers in Chinese government programs targeting 
these products.
MNC R&D STRATEGIES IN CHINA
As Table 2 shows, MNC strategies have focused primarily 
on using low-cost talent to exploit their technology assets 
by localizing existing products to the Chinese market rather 
than developing technologies for global markets. However, 
R&D activities have evolved as local scientists and engineers 
have gained experience and capabilities, as well as the con-
fidence of corporate management. Although no China lab 
has the independent authority enjoyed by more established 
labs in Europe, Japan, or Israel, some have begun to move 
in that direction.
MNC 1: Computers, software, and services
The China R&D group in MNC 1 focuses on localiza-
tion of products for China and on testing for the whole 
In the case of indigenous innovation, US MNCs made a 
major issue of discrimination in the procurement aspects 
of the policy and obtained support from the US government 
in negotiating with China on the issue. Possibly as a result, 
the Chinese government announced changes in its policy 
during President Hu’s state visit to Washington in January 
2011. Specifically, the Chinese promised to delink indig-
enous innovation from government procurement (www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE70J7RL20110121).
The White House described the agreement as fol-
lows (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/
fact-sheet-us-china-economic-issues):
•	 The US and China agreed that government procure-
ment decisions will not be made based on where the 
goods’ or services’ IP is developed or maintained, that 
there will be no discrimination against innovative 
products made by foreign suppliers operating in China, 
and that China will delink its innovation policies from 
its government procurement preferences.
•	 China agreed to eliminate discriminatory indigenous 
innovation criteria used to select industrial equipment 
Table 2. Motivation, activities, and management of China R&D.
Characteristics MNC 1 MNC 2 MNC 3 MNC 4 MNC 5
Factors influencing R&D location in China
Key motivations for 
R&D in China
Market access, 
understand market, 
influence policy, 
access to talent
Market access, 
understand market 
needs, access to 
talent
Win government 
favor and support for 
IP protection
Market access, low-
cost talent, be a 
“good citizen”
Win government 
favor, develop China 
as major market, tap 
local talent
MNC interaction with the local innovation system
Local partnerships University-focused: 
hire talented stu-
dents, joint projects
Joint R&D projects 
with universities
Industry and univer-
sity focused, 
outsourced software 
development
Joint R&D projects 
and education 
programs
Industry focused
IP policies IP managed globally IP managed globally, 
share IP from joint 
projects
IP managed globally IP managed globally, 
share IP from joint 
research
IP registered in China 
and globally if devel-
oped in China
Response to indige-
nous innovation 
policy
Try to influence and 
shape policy behind 
the scenes
Does not seek treat-
ment as domestic 
company
Developing local 
outsource suppliers, 
attract R&D to China
Built a fabrication 
plant, increased R&D 
activity
Certified as high-tech 
company for lower 
tax rate
China R&D strategy
R&D activities in 
China
Development and 
testing for global 
teams, localization
Localization, poten-
tial to develop 
technology for 
global market
Research and 
develop technolo-
gies for global 
business units
Develop extensions 
of existing technolo-
gies for local market, 
possible use in other 
markets; testbed for 
unique conditions
Development for 
local market, devel-
opment and test for 
global projects
Management control Limited control, deci-
sions made in US or 
elsewhere
Limited control, deci-
sions made in US
Independent pro-
jects, integrated into 
global projects; busi-
ness units are all 
represented in China 
lab
Matrixed organiza-
tion reporting to 
local management 
and corporate teams
Lead some global 
projects, compete 
with other global 
labs
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develop a domestic outsourcing industry that is competi-
tive with India.
MNC 4: Semiconductors
MNC 4 has been aggressive in trying to transition from 
little more than a satellite operation created for public rela-
tions to an independent lab on par with other leading labs 
outside the US.
The director of research at MNC 4 stated that the com-
pany’s R&D had gone through four phases since it first 
established a lab in China 10 years ago. At first, MNC 4 was 
just trying to “give back to China,” as it had been making a 
lot of money there.
In the initial phase, Chinese engineers were well behind 
the skills of their counterparts in other countries. They thus 
worked on software that was for internal use only, not for 
the company’s products. In the second phase, teams in 
the US sent tasks to the China lab for the development of 
designs initiated in the US. In the third phase, some senior 
engineers in China could initiate a project, but the team in 
China could not carry out the entire project. The current 
fourth phase is a shift to developing an independent R&D 
lab capable of carrying out complete projects to develop 
technologies for use in China and other markets.
MNC 5: Mobile communications
MNC 5 has a history of extensive R&D activity in China, 
a major market and operational center for the company. Its 
R&D labs are part of a global network, and the company 
expects that China will move from a following to a leading 
role over time. According to the R&D director,
Our different R&D centers around the world coordinate 
and compete with one another. The R&D centers try to get 
involved in projects rather than just wait to be chosen. Each 
business unit looks at R&D globally and decides where it 
wants to do things. If the cost of other locations is too high, 
they’re likely to grow more in China. Our R&D center’s mis-
sion is to transition R&D from localization and support to 
development projects and then to projects for some global 
markets. 
EXPECTATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The MNCs in this study conduct R&D in China primar-
ily because China’s government at least implicitly expects 
such investment in exchange for market access and favor-
able treatment. Some seek to exploit China’s large pool of 
low-cost talent; others see market opportunities for their 
products and services as well as learning opportunities that 
they can apply to other large emerging markets. They also 
seek to meet the special requirements of local customers.
These R&D centers seldom operate independently of an 
MNC’s business units or its other R&D units. Most perform 
a well-proscribed development function within this larger 
corporation. It thus works on a broad scope of technolo-
gies, but MNC 1 still limits its role to a small part of the 
R&D process. This R&D group does not act autonomously, 
but is under the control of corporate R&D management. 
According to one MNC 1 interviewee,
China R&D does product R&D for our whole corpo-
rate business model. China does the test phase and some 
localization; architectural design and business development 
and delivery models are all done by units outside China. 
We invest a lot rotating people in China through the vari-
ous labs. In the future, some development and business 
direction may shift to China, but decisions about product 
offerings and positioning of the product will be decided 
outside China.
MNC 2: Computers
In MNC 2, the China lab serves the company’s business 
units and participates in development for those units rather 
than in research. However, there is some room for local 
initiative, with the possibility of developing technologies 
for use in the parent company.
“[MNC 2] is close to [our] business units. We develop 
demos that the business units request. We also develop 
demos based on our own imagination and show them to 
the business units.”
IP developed in partnership with local universities is 
jointly owned; the company files patents in China as well 
as the US. As one interviewee said, “Patenting is not dif-
ferent in China from elsewhere. [We] have experienced, 
professional people in the company to help with patenting.”
MNC 3: Software
MNC 3 operates as an independent R&D unit serving 
the firm’s global businesses. All of the company’s business 
units are present in the China lab and operate indepen-
dently of each other, working on their own projects. The lab 
director referred to this as a federated model. This company 
has a heavy focus on basic research and operates its China 
lab accordingly, “hiring top researchers and leaving them 
alone,” according to the director.
MNC 3 also does a substantial amount of software 
localization and outsources to local firms as part of an 
agreement with the government. The goal is to help China 
IP developed in partnership with local 
universities is jointly owned; the 
company files patents in China as  
well as the US.
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global sales in 2011 (www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-19/
china-becomes-apple-s-second-largest-market-by-sales-
cook-says.html#). Whether Apple can sustain its growth 
without committing to R&D in China remains to be seen. 
One lesson from the history of MNCs in China is that 
an MNC should not individually challenge policies that it 
finds unacceptable. China does not need any individual 
MNC, but it does need MNCs as a group to help achieve its 
technology goals. So the government sometimes reconsid-
ers when facing complaints from several MNCs, especially 
when these firms can rally local allies, as in the Green Dam 
case. MNCs can also solicit pressure from the US or other 
governments, especially when a policy is inconsistent with 
international rules.
Google’s experience highlights the risks of a direct chal-
lenge to the government by a single company. China’s rich 
complexity requires that MNCs develop a highly nuanced 
strategic approach. MNCs must balance helping to advance 
China’s goals in return for market access without giving up 
their own sources of competitive advantage.
Because of strong motivations to invest in R&D regard-less of policies, it appears that in many cases, China’s indigenous innovation policies do not matter. Com-
panies with experience in China continue to prosper. As 
Apple’s experience demonstrates, even new entrants that 
have products Chinese consumers want can do very well. 
Indigenous innovation policies might even benefit MNCs 
that have a strong commitment to China, but those com-
panies must be very careful about exposing IP to take 
advantage of government incentives. 
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